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Review Pudovkin's Precept, Part 2: 
'This Method of Temporal Concentration' 
 
 
Pudovkin's precept could be used by filmmakers when making movies of any kind. 
Pudovkin, however, had never intended to give filmmakers a tool for making movies of 
any kind. He had wished rather to assist them to make works of art.  
 
To make films artistically, however, as some filmmakers soon sensed, they would have 
to deepen their understanding of Pudovkin's 'basic method of filmmaking', retraining 
themselves to learn how to mimic the shifts of attention to an event of an imaginary 
observer who was not only invisible and freely mobile (the core of the common 
construal) but as sensitive as possible to its social, political and thus historical import – a 
task far more exacting than many filmmakers could comprehend, much less undertake. 
 
To be a work of art, Pudovkin claimed, a film must differ from life, the greater the 
difference, the greater the art. 
 
Between the natural event and its appearance upon the screen there is a 
marked difference. It is exactly this difference that makes the film an art. (FTFA, 
page 86) 
 
Some commentators, reading the above, have applauded or condemned Pudovkin for 
advocating surrealism or even irrealism in art.1 Others, contrasting it with his insistence 
that filmmakers ought always to respect how we attend naturally to things, have 
concluded that Pudovkin's suggestions were incoherent at their core. 
 
1 Pudovkin assisted such misconstruals on occasion by unwittingly misdescribing his own 
work, conflating it seemingly with Eisenstein's notions of 'associative montage'. For example, he 
describes the episode in MOTHER of Pavel's joy in prison as he receives the news of his 
impending release as follows: "The problem was the expression, filmically, of his joy. The 
photographing of a face lighting up with joy would have been flat and void of effect. I show, 
therefore, the nervous play of his hands and a big close-up of the lower half of his face, the 
corners of the smile. These shots I cut in with other and varied material – shots of a brook, 
swollen with rapid flow of spring, of the play of sunlight broken on the water, birds splashing in 
the village pond, and finally a laughing child. By the junction of these components our 
expression of 'prisoner's joy' takes place." (FTFA, page 27). Cited by Ernest Lindgren on page 86 
of his The Art of the Film (London, England: George Allen & Unwin Limited, second edition, 1963 
[1948]) as a prelude to his sympathetic but more exact recounting of the same sequence, noting 
in particular that Pudovkin's description is "not accurate in its details" – having already noted on 
page 83 that Pudovkin has neglected to mention that he carefully places a title before the 
intercut shots, announcing that 'meanwhile outside spring has arrived', shifting the context from 
conceptual to perceptual association, retrenching naturalism. 
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Pudovkin never claimed, however, that films could differ from life in any way at all and 
still function artistically. On the contrary! As he affirmed in the next sentence, an event 
could be encountered more artistically by means of film only if we were thereby 
enabled to attend to fewer unimportant aspects of it, the event having been 
concentrated temporally. 
 
Guided by the director, the camera assumes the task of removing every 
superfluity and directing the attention of the spectator in such a way that he 
shall see only that which is significant and characteristic. (FFTA, page 86) 
 
As Pudovkin insisted, indeed, it is "this method of temporal concentration" that "forms 
the actual basis of filmic representation" – the 'basic method of filmmaking', properly 
understood. 
 
[The director] can, in the composition of the filmic form of any given 
appearance, eliminate all points of interval, and thus concentrate the action in 
time to the highest degree he may require. ... This method of temporal 
concentration, the concentration of action by the elimination of unnecessary 
points of interval, occurs also, in a more simplified form, in the theatre ... In the 
film this method is not only pursued to a maximum, it forms the actual basis of 
filmic representation. ... [The film director] can concentrate in time not only 
separate incidents, but even the movements of a single person. This process, 
that has often been termed a 'film trick', is, in fact, nothing other than the 
characteristic method of filmic representation. (FTFA, pages 84 and 85) 
 
Pudovkin could hardly have written more clearly, yet readers, blinders in place, continue 
to disregard what he said as aberrant or insignificant, confusing the severe constraints 
of his programme of eliminative naturalism for others of little or no consequence. 
 
Pudovkin's conception of constructive editing, for example, differed from the montage 
advocated by Eisenstein circa 1926 in both its aims (that ought to have been obvious, 
though many have lumped them together) and its processes. For Eisenstein, montage 
was the joining together of shots to compel viewers to experience a uniquely 
cinematical event, much as an artist working in clay might construct a uniquely 
sculptural object that could never have existed if the clay had never been lumped 
together by the fabricator. For Pudovkin, however, the joining together of shots was 
only the last step in a three-step process, the first two of which had necessarily to be 
free of imagined cinematical constraints. (1) One had to imagine an event, and then (2) 
think of how one would attend to it, aspect by aspect, if freely mobile in space and time. 
Only then (3) could one reckon properly how to use the tools of filmmaking to enable 
viewer's to attend thusly to them.  
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To Pudovkin, unlike the young Eisenstein, an event had to be attendable imaginatively 
prior to its cinematical conception and generation (whether it be an animated event, a 
segment of coloured music, a documentary or an experimental sequence). 
 
When the work on the general construction has been finished, the theme 
molded to a subject, the separate scenes in which the action is realized laid 
down, then only do we come to the period of the hardest work on the 
treatment of the scenario, that stage of work when, already concrete and 
perceptible, that filmic form of the picture that will result can be foreseen; [then 
only] do we come to the period of the planning out of the editing scheme for 
the shots, of the discovery of those component parts from which the separate 
images will later be assembled. (pages 129 & 130; italics: EWC) 
 
Filmmaking, to Pudovkin, was therefore a process of eliminating unessential aspects of 
an imagined event, followed by a capturing and presentation of the remainder by means 
of the tools of filmmaking. The event had to be imagined as existing apart from the 
constraints of the cinematical tools that would be used to present aspects of it, much as 
a carved figure of granite, now an object of admiration, once lay envisaged but 
embedded within a larger block awaiting the elimination of unessentials by the carver. 
 
I have here contrasted fabricators with carvers, lumping Eisenstein with the one and 
Pudovkin with the other.2 Eisenstein, late in life, was to revise his earlier misconception 
of montage, and therewith the process of filmmaking, to accord with Pudovkin's. As 
they confronted one another in the 1920s, however, the difference between them was 
profound, mirroring the distinction among sculptors between fabricators and carvers, 
but focused upon a medium wherein, as Eisenstein would later confirm, the inherent 




An Ideal, Perspicuous Observer 
 
2 Pudovkin preferred to compare the process of making a film to a task in which 
mathematicians often engage, namely differentiating (that is, analyzing into parts) followed by 
integrating (that is, combining the parts analyzed into a whole). "In the work of the 
mathematician there follows after dissection into elements, after 'differentiation', a 
combination of the discovered separate elements to a whole – the so-called 'integration'. In the 
work of the film director the process of analysis, the dissection into elements, forms equally only 
a point of departure which has to be followed by the assemblage of the whole from the 
discovered parts. The finding of the elements, the details of the action, implies only the 
completion of a preparatory task. It must be remembered [however] that from these parts the 
complete work is finally to emerge ..." (FTFA, pages 96 and 97) 
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It was Pudovkin's second restriction upon the scope of his precept, however, that was to 
distinguish his theory of film design from every other in the history of the art, elevating 
it from a maxim of craft into profundity.  
 
To filmmakers, Pudovkin had proposed a precept that could seemingly be applied 
regardless of the kind of event being imagined. It seemed so, however, only because 
they had inadvertently presumed that the events a film ought to present should be 
identically attendable by everyone. They had presumed, as we have seen, that the 
question posed by Pudovkin in his precept should read as follows: 
 
To what aspects of the event, in what order, from what perspective and 
for how long would you attend were you to witness it, earnestly but 
unobserved, as would a being of only ordinary discernment, wisdom and 
awareness, if free to move instantaneously to any viewpoint in space and 
time as the event unfolds? 
 
But Pudovkin had nowhere suggested that one ought by means of film to access events 
as an ordinary observer might do, with ordinary care and attentiveness, if freed from 
the constraints of embodied participation. On the contrary! 
 
The viewpoint of the camera is scarcely ever the exact viewpoint of an ordinary 
spectator. The power of the film director lies in the fact that he can force the 
spectator to see an object not as it is easiest to see it. (pages 154 and 155; italics 
EWC) 
 
Indeed, as Pudovkin insisted, one ought never to present an event by means of film as 
"everyone" would see it, for to do so would "accomplish nothing". 
 
The camera, as it were, forces itself, ever striving, into the profoundest deeps of 
life; it strives thither to penetrate, whither the average spectator never reaches 
as he glances casually around him. ... To show something as everyone sees it is 
to have accomplished nothing. Not that material that is embraced in a first, 
casual, merely general and superficial glance is required, but that which 
discloses itself to an intent and searching glance, that can and will see deeper. 
(FTFA, pages 91 and 92) 
 
Pudovkin is here making his most remarkable claim, namely that a viable cinematic 
encounter can only occur when the event being encountered (the material, that is) is 
rich enough to permit discriminatory access by a freely-mobile being of extraordinary 
sensitivity and awareness. Reconstrued accurately, therefore, Pudovkin's precept reads 
as follows: 
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Pudovkin's Precept Reconstrued: A film ought to be a work of art. To enable 
viewers to encounter an event by means of film that will engage them as 
artistically as possible, answer the following questions: 
 
To what aspects of the event, in what order, from what perspective and 
for how long would you attend were you to witness it unobserved as a 
being of extraordinary discernment, wisdom and awareness, if free to 
move instantaneously to any viewpoint in space and time as the event 
unfolds? 
 
Do those aspects differ from those to which an "average spectator" 
would have attended, enabling you to "penetrate" distinguishably to the 
"profoundest deeps of life"? 
 
If so, then, by means of the tools of filmmaking, construct a film that will enable 
viewers to attend only to those aspects, in that order, from that perspective and 
for that duration. If not, stop! 
 
Pudovkin's precept, therefore, unequivocally subordinates the form of a film to its 
matter (the pattern of its structuring, that is, to the material being structured), and we 
can sense from the difference between his precept and the common misconstrual of it 
by filmmakers how they put the cart before the horse when restricting its application to 
making of films within the "classic Hollywood cinema". The material encompassed by 
such films does not derive its superficiality from the use of Pudovkin's precept in 
shaping its presentation. On the contrary, the coarseness of the material precludes 
application of the precept! The precept, accurately construed, cannot even be applied 
to the material of the such films without subverting the questions Pudovkin required 
filmmakers to ask. To blame Pudovkin's precept for the superficiality of mainstream 
filmmaking is to blame it for failing to make a silk purse from a sow's ear. 
 
To say so, however, is only to scratch the surface of the provocation that Pudovkin 
presented through the materiality of his precept, for it implies the most radical revision 
of the task of filmmaking ever put forward by any thinker. To see how, we must work 
through its implications, deriving from it a host of connected insights about the history 
of filmmaking to which too few have attended, much less understood, each of them, in 
its way, reaffirming an aspect of the disposition toward naturalism inhering in the 
cinematical tools when used most simply, directly and powerfully, distinguishing them 
from the tools used by other artists when creating coherent events in their arts. By 
doing so, we shall come to understand much that would otherwise be inexplicable in 
film design. 
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An Historical Witness 
 
Pudovkin's (and Eisenstein's) insistence that every film resonate historically has often 
been trivialized as a parochial residue of their Marxist commitments. To North 
Americans, swept up in the ahistorical sweep of a civilization determined to consume 
everything in the name of progress, including itself, it could hardly have appeared 
otherwise.3 
 
To be a witness of extraordinary discernment, wisdom and awareness, however, free to 
encounter an event from any perspective in time, is, as Pudovkin insisted, to be 
necessarily an observer having historical insight and sensitivity, for, free to move in 
time, a witness may access the event from the perspective of the past. A filmmaker 
must therefore be capable of imagining to which aspects of an event an historically 
cognizant observer would attend, whether the film be enacted, documentary, animated, 
colour music or experimental. Makers of profound films, therefore, must not only be 
aware of the historical context of the events they present, but of their own identities as 
historical beings attending to them.  
 
The adverbial conclusion that how one encounters events by means of film must be 
historical to be profound, regardless of whether the events themselves are historically 
significant, is a deep derivative of Pudovkin's principle rather than a Marxist aberration. 
To imagine things most profoundly, filmmakers must be historically aware of 
themselves, of the things they observe and of their observing of them. 
 
To those of us living through the collapse of the cultural, educational and artistical 
enterprises of North America, and of filmmaking and its teaching in particular, 
Pudovkin's insistence is sobering.  
 
We can now understand, as well, a consequence of the historicity of the encounter with 
an event that Pudovkin's precept prescribes for filmmakers, namely why, for most 
viewers of only ordinary discernment, wisdom and awareness, great films date, whereas 
great performable works of musical art, for example, do not?  
 
3 Besides, Pudovkin, like Eisenstein, often misplaced the historical resonance, 
misconstruing it adjectivally rather than adverbially by insisting that the events one encountered 
by means of film had to be historical rather than how one attended to them. See, for example, 
Pudovkin's discussion of "The Theme" and its "Action-Treatment",  FTFA, pages 35-45, where he 
presupposes not only that every profound film must have an articulatable theme, but that the 
theme must be a focused general proposition about human beings in historical context in 
accordance with Marxist realism. 
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Events long past re-presented by means of film may prove engaging to viewers 
interested in others, and hence capable of being interested in others who lived in the 
past, even though they cannot be encountered by means of film in the present as 
naturally as they were once encounterable; for we, attuned to events in a later time, can 
bring to our encounters with them at best only an abridged understanding of the 
nuanced historical identities of the things we see and hear. We see and hear them as 
they were, whereas our habits and intuitions are attuned to the things among which we 
live and move as they are, and no imaginative effort can fully bridge the gap. 
 
Godard's films of the 1960s, for example, were remarkably powerful when released, for 
they presented events of a uniquely nuanced interest to many living through the 
decade. Today, however, they are of interest only to cinematical connoisseurs and will 
never again engage general audiences profoundly, for the events they encompass so 
exemplify their unique and subtle historical identities that they would require a 
matching historical consciousness to be fully appreciated. 
 
For all viewers, the dating of the events encountered by means of a film entails a 
reduction in its power and interest, a feature unparalleled in other arts. Some films may 
garner increased interest amongst historically-adept connoisseurs as their date, and a 
very few may sustain interest amongst a wider audience for exceptional and subtle 
reasons perplexing even their makers (CASABLANCA, for example, and IT'S A 
WONDERFUL LIFE).  
 
The exceptions prove the rule, however: persons and other things seen by means of film 
invariably exemplify their historical identities, whereas a plagal cadence, for example, 
when heard in a live performance, need have none. A plagal cadence, like all musical 
structures, can be recreated by performers at any time and anywhere, and is then heard 
as it is, not as some other exemplification of it was once was. However resonant it may 
be of its ancestral exemplifications, it is encountered as the new and unique event it is 
rather than, as with films, as a presentation of an event that was. (Recordings of past 
musical events, of course, just like films, present historical events to us as they were, 
and hence date. They degenerate less in general interest, however, for the events they 
present carry less historical baggage in their appearance to us.) 
 
 
Reattending to Events  
 
Pudovkin's imagined observer was to be as discerning, wise and aware as possible, to be 
and freely mobile in time. Obviously, therefore, the observer must be as discerning, wise 
and aware as a being freely mobile in time could be!  But this implies that filmmakers 
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must enable us to attend to events as if we had encountered them before, a startling 
consequence upon which neither Pudovkin nor anyone else, to my knowledge, has 
remarked. 
 
Profound films (be they documentaries, westerns, musicals or romps with animated 
bunnies) deepen our engagement with the things we encounter upon repeated 
viewings! But how is that possible? How, having already attended to the events, aspect 
by aspect, can re-attending to them enlighten us? 
 
To answer the question, consider how we are constrained to attend to the events that 
occur around and about us as compared to how differently we remember them, and 
how differently, could we do so, we would reattend to them as freely mobile observers. 
The events we encounter about us cannot be reattended, only remembered. Were we 
able to reattend to them as beings freely mobile in time, however, knowing what we 
now know of them in hindsight, we should undoubtedly choose to attend to different 
aspects of them then we were compelled initially to do as participants, and were we 
able to do so recurringly, we should eventually discover which aspects in which order 
repay repeated attention. 
 
Pudovkin's principle, therefore, implies a provocative answer to our question 
unrecognized by its author. 
 
To encounter an event by means of film as evocatively as possible, we 
must attend to it as a profound and freely-mobile observer would have 
done if recurringly familiar with it! 
 
We must attend to it, that is, as if we had recurringly encountered it in the past and 
were now able to attend only to those aspects of it most worthy of sustained and 
repeated attention. Only then could repeated viewings of an event, aspect by aspect, 
continue to engage and enlighten us. 
 
Few thinkers have pondered the puzzle, for example, of how it is possible for 
suspenseful films to be worthy of repeated reviewing. The answer, I suggest, derives 
directly from Pudovkin's principle, namely that if a suspenseful film is to be recurringly 
engaging, the suspense must arise from our attending to aspects of things to which a 
discerning, wise and aware observer would choose to attend, seeking further 
enlightenment, having attended to them often in the past and hence knowing already 
what is to occur. 
 
Again we sense the incipient power of Pudovkin's admonition that filmmakers must not 
present things to us as an observer would attend to them in  
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... a first, casual, merely general and superficial glance ..., but that which 
discloses itself to an intent and searching glance, that can and will see deeper. 
FTFA, pages 91 and 92)  
 
The film spectator is an ideal, perspicuous observer. And it is the director who 
makes him so. (FTFA, page 91) 
 
Pudovkin's "ideal, perspicuous observer" must be able to move freely in space and time 
to achieve the most resonant perspectives on the events encountered. Being thus able 
to re-encounter events as profoundly as possible, his imagined observer is compelled to 
do so. To do anything less would be to encounter things less profoundly than possible, 
contrary to Pudovkin's precept – through Pudovkin never knew it. 
 
 
An Art without Rules 
 
From Pudovkin's precept, we may draw a complex conclusion of remarkable subtlety: 
(a) when envisioning a film, the material must determine the form; hence (b) films 
should be made only of material that can determine its form; hence (c) films should be 
made only of material that precludes the use of rules when determining its form. 
 
Think again of the event upon which we focused in Section 1: the young woman, about 
to retire, sitting on the edge of her bed, taking off her shoes. To what aspects of the 
event, in what order, from what angle and for how long would an observer of 
extraordinary discernment, wisdom and sensitivity attend were they no killer in the 
closet? Clearly, there is no single answer, for there could be many attentive who, given 
subtle differences in their cultural, political, religious, educational, sociological and 
psychological backgrounds, and the freedom of choice inherent in a dramatically 
unbiased event, might attend to subtly different aspects of it as it unfolds. 
 
How, for example, might a neurotic with a foot fetish attend to it? As Stroheim 
presented it in THE MERRY WIDOW? Or how might a Zen master attend to it? As Ozu 
might have enabled us to encounter it had he put his mind to it? Possibly, but not 
exclusively, and assuredly not by rule. As even a cursory working acquaintance with 
Pudovkin's precept will attest, not even maxims (that is, handy empirical generalizations 
useful most of the time) independent of the material can be derived from it – and yet 
the precept applies! (The most that can be said in general is that filmmakers would 
court failure were they to try to use Ozu's "style" with a killer in the closet, or the 
"classic Hollywood" style without one. To speak of a "style" without specifying maxims 
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of use, however, as so many have done with Ozu and others for whom none can be 
given, is to suggest nothing practical about the films were made.)4  
 
 
Persistence of Form 
 
Filmmaking, being a material art, can have no unexceptional rules of formation. From 
this some have assumed that we must therefore be formally unconstrained when 
making films: anything goes! 
 
As Pudovkin could have predicted, however, exactly the contrary is the case. Powerful 
films, Pudovkin insisted, must enable us to attend naturally to the events we encounter 
by means of them. By all the evidence, however, human beings since the dawn of 
history have attended to things about them in remarkably consistent ways. The epic of 
Gilgamesh, for example, could today be credibly re-enacted by actors in modern dress; 
the battle-scenes of Homer are screenplays awaiting transcription; and the comments of 
Job or Socrates can be as thoughtfully pondered today as ever. 
 
How we are habituated to attend naturally to things, therefore, even the most 
discerning, wise and aware among us, has changed little if at all since the dawn of 
recorded history. The time scale of our perceptual evolution is so long (the time it takes, 
that is, to shift our genetic codings for perception) when compared to the brief span of 
our recorded history that it is hardly surprising that over the past 3000 years or so no 
fundamental changes in our human habits of attending to things have been discernible.  
 
It follows, therefore, that innovation in filmmaking, unlike in other arts less naturally 
constrained, will accrue to filmmakers largely as they conceive of the events that are to 
be encountered by means of their films (that is, as they design their screenplays in 
master-scene form) rather than as they solve the cinematical problems of how to 
 
4 The attribution to Stroheim of having a 'foot fetish' is due to his enemy, Thalberg. 
Although I have thought often of the ponderings of David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson with 
respect to the work of Yasujiro Ozu and accept entirely their conviction that Ozu was not 
working within the "Hollywood" style, I counter here what I take to be an inference that many 
have drawn from their work and which they seem to share, namely, that no precept 
encompasses both fruitfully. Pudovkin's assuredly does. Indeed, it is only from within Pudovkin's 
principle that we can understand how Ozu's practice, or Stroheim's, differs from that of John 
Ford or George Roy Hill. (See David Bordwell Ozu and the Poetics of Cinema (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988; and pages 276-278 in particular of Thompson and 
Bordwell's Film History: An Introduction (New York, New York: McGraw-Hill, Incorporated, 
1994). 
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present them, reaffirming Pudovkin's insistence that filmmaking is a material rather 
than a formal art. 
 
As one would expect, therefore, and as the history of filmmaking confirms at every turn, 
the most powerful films of today are sequenced almost exactly as were the most 
powerful films of yesterday. What has changed are the kinds of events that fascinate us 
today in contrast to the kinds of events that were of interest, say, to others in the 1920s, 
but how the events are presented is largely identical (whether within enacted, 
documentary, animated or any other kind of powerful films), as one would expect from 
Pudovkin's precept and the capacities of the cinematical tools.5  
 
As filmmakers, Pudovkin implied, we are formally free, but only to the extent that the 
material permits! No event, considered in isolation, is by its nature prohibited from 
being effectively presented by means of film; hence no shot or sequence of shots, no 
pattern of movement or lighting or acting, etc., considered in isolation, is by its nature 
impossible to encompass within a worthy film. It is a question of context (i.e., of the 
material). Whether or not we encounter an event coherently by means of a film 
depends upon the context of events within which it is perceived, not the kind of event it 
is. If, in context, what we see and hear accords with what a maximally attentive yet 
mobile being would have seen and heard, having seen and heard what we saw and 
heard before, then our integrity as enlightened witnesses will have been maintained. If 
not, incoherence will result. As Augustine once said of filmmaking (or almost so): 
anything goes, but not always or everywhere!6 
 
5 It is remarkable how exactly that great student of the history of art, Erwin Panofsky, 
writing in 1934, came to comprehending this difference between filmmaking and other arts. "It 
is the movies, and only the movies, that do justice to that materialistic interpretation of the 
universe which, whether we like it or not, pervades contemporary civilization. ... the movies 
organize material things and persons, not a neutral medium, into a composition that receives its 
style, and may even become fantastic or preter-voluntarily symbolic, not so much by an 
interpretation in the artist's mind as by the actual manipulation of physical objects ... All these 
objects and persons must be organized into a work of art. They can be arranged in all sorts of 
ways ("arrangement" comprising, of course, such things as make-up, lighting and camera work); 
but there is no running away from them. ... To prestylze reality prior to tackling it amounts to 
dodging the problem. The problem is to manipulate and shoot unstylized reality in such a way 
that the result has style. This is a proposition no less legitimate and no less difficult than any 
proposition in the older arts." Erwin Panofsky, "Style and Medium in the Moving Pictures", 
Bulletin of the Department of Art and Archaeology (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University, 
1934)). Passages quoted are from pages 31 and 32 of the essay as reprinted on pages 15-32 of 
Daniel Talbot's anthology, op. cit. (see footnote 2 above). 
 
6 When Augustine admonished us to "Love God, then do what you wish", he was 
reminding us that anything goes, but only in context. 
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Once again we must recognise that nothing in Pudovkin's precept precludes us from 
perceiving coherently by means of film events, or aspects of them, of any particular 
kind. We may encounter animated rabbits, lying politicians, moving patterns of colour 
music, nonnarrative mood pieces or even verité documentaries calculated to disengage 




Two Tendences of Filmmaking 
 
Of all the tools available to artists, the cinematical are those by means of which we may 
perceive things as identically as possible to the ways in which we perceive things about 
us. From this simple consequent of Pudovkin's principle, one might have predicted two 
tendencies to which filmmakers have consistently reverted throughout the history of 
filmmaking, and to which we may anticipate they will continue to revert, neither 
obligatory but both coincident with the most compelling capacities of their tools. 
 
Pudovkin's principle implied that we must encounter things naturally by means of films 
if we are to perceive them most coherently and hence powerfully. Nowhere, however, 
did he imply that the things that we encounter naturally must be natural things! As 
already noted, we may encounter objects by means of films that are as fantastical, 
extraordinary and atypical as we can imagine. We must perceive them naturally, 
however, to engage with them deeply. 
 
Obviously, however, the cinematical tools can present natural things to us naturally as 
well, and can do with unique fidelity, ease and power. Most filmmakers, unsurprisingly, 
have been prompted to spend most of their time making either historical films (fictional 
or otherwise) or documentary ones encompassing natural objects naturally seen. 
 
No one who has worked sensitively, respectfully and comprehensively with the tools 
available to filmmakers could be either surprised or angered by this tendency. Indeed, 
the capacity to present natural things naturally so clearly distinguishes the cinematical 
from all other artistical tools that the claim that filmmaking was the first of the natural 
arts is hardly hyperbolical. Rather, it is trivially true, as every perceiver of natural things 
can naturally attest.7 
 
The second tendency, unobligatory but compelling, derives as well from the 
distinguishingly capacity of the cinematical tools to present natural things naturally. 
 
7 I construe photography here as a forerunner of filmmaking. 
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Pudovkin's principle was applicable far beyond the limits of his examples. His examples, 
mirroring the practices of Griffith and the propensities of his Russian colleagues, were 
selected from films that compelled viewers to attend sequentially to aspects of events 
exclusively by cutting between shots. 
 
As Pudovkin himself had emphasized, however, cutting between shots was simply a 
means to an end, namely the "compulsory and deliberate guidance of the thoughts and 
associations of the spectator" (FTFA, page 73). However restricted his examples, 
therefore, his principle left open the possibility that other means might be found to the 
same end. 
 
Filmmakers before and after Pudovkin have often tried to compel the attention of 
spectators to successive aspects of things within shots by selective lighting, movement 
of camera or actors or alternating shifts of conversation, and some of them, when 
extraordinarily careful, have succeeded. When wishing to engage us most subtly and 
deeply, however, our greatest filmmakers, including those like Kurosawa quite capable 
of using moving cameras in extended takes effectively, have tended recurringly to 
ensure our successive attention to aspects of things by simply cutting between shots 
photographed from stable camera positions, exactly as Pudovkin's examples would 
suggest. 
 
As Luis Buñuel once put it, echoing a sentiment expressed at some time or another by 
almost every other filmmaker of comparable power from Flaherty through Ford to 
Fassbinder, 
 
I've a horror of films de cadrages. I detest unusual angles. I sometimes work out 
a marvellously clever shot with my cameraman. Everything is all beautifully 
prepared, and we just burst out laughing and scrap the whole thing to shoot 
quite straight forwardly with no camera effects.8 
 
The tendency of exemplary filmmakers to respect the restrictions of Pudovkin's 
examples as well as his principle, especially during moments of deep and quiet subtlety 
in enacted films, is hardly accidental. Because a screen is a flat surface, things 
encountered by means of film are seen two-dimensionally. When encountering events 
by means of film, therefore, our attention can be diverted more easily to peripheral 




8 Quoted by David Robinson in "Thank God – I'm Still an Atheist: Luis Bunuel and 
Viridiana", Sight & Sound, #31 (Summer, 1962), page 118. 
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However carefully things may be controlled within a shot, therefore, perceptual clutter 
is inevitable. Lengthy shots, encompassing more things, encompass more clutter. 
Sensitive filmmakers, therefore, at moments when clutter, if attended, would be most 
disastrous, have always tended to guide our attention most simply and naturally by 
cutting between shots rather than playing games within them, and will continue to do 
so, behaving not only as Pudovkin said they should, but as he showed as well. 
 
 
A Feminist Perspective 
 
Pudovkin's precept, as intended, severely restricts the behavior of filmmakers. 
Nowhere, however, does it prohibit filmmakers from bringing to the making of their 
films whatever uncommon attributes of discernment, wisdom and awareness they may 
possess because of their gender, race or sexual orientation. On the contrary! 
 
Members of disadvantaged groups within every society have consistently been denied 
the opportunity to make movies. Unsurprisingly, when a few among them have been 
permitted to do so, they have often rejected not only the kinds of things shown in the 
movies of the repressive culture, but how they have been shown as well. Having failed 
to think through the tool Pudovkin gave them, they have confused it with the precepts 
of the "Hollywood" style or the maxims of the pseudo-documents of 60 Minutes, 
misconstruing it as a convention that could be disregarded for alternatives. 
 
The result, sadly, has too often accentuated their disadvantage within the society, 
rendering both themselves and others who share their interests increasingly marginal, 
for rather than showing things that ought to have been seen, and seen naturally enough 
to compel others to engage deeply and profoundly with them, they have shown things 
less naturally and hence less simply, directly and coherently than they might have been 
shown, limiting unwittingly the possibility of pervasive engagement by anyone. 
 
Consider, for example, the challenge facing feminist filmmakers in North America as I 
write.9 They wish to make films and, if so, must do it within a society controlled by men 
who denigrate the importance or even the possibility of their endeavour, marginalize 
their unique encounters as women with the things about them, trivialize or 




9 A comparable case could be made for filmmaking by Blacks, Chicanos, Métis, Inuit or 
any others of the disadvantaged. 
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We noted above that a filmmaker cannot follow Pudovkin's precept without having 
become the profound and discerning observer they are imagining. Identities are non-
transferable. From which it follows, of course, that no one can imagine profoundly how 
another would attend to an event. In particular,  
 
 No male can imagine profoundly how a female would attend to an event. 
 
Within a culture within which women have been summarily deprived of the opportunity 
to make significant films, the male bias in how we are compelled to perceive things by 
means of the films we see, whether as men or women, must therefore be far more 
subtly, pervasively and deeply entrenched and thus will prove far more difficult to 
counteract than even the complaints of Laura Mulvey would allow.10 
 
Assuredly it has something to do with the kinds of things we are compelled to see, and 
feminist filmmakers striving to show us other things have my thorough-going sympathy. 
But therein lies a danger, for it will make no difference if women make films of other 
kinds of things having mistrained themselves to think of them as men have done, 
denigrating the things already about us while attempting to put other, different things in 
their place. That's how males have long conceived of the world, as a place into which to 
put the different things they make in the name of progress. To assert, "I can put into the 
world the different things I have made and compel you to attend to them!" is as 
masculine a sentiment as I can imagine, whether voiced by an artist or a politician, a 
woman or a man. 
 
It will never be enough, therefore, to show different things (though surely we oughtn't 
to wallow in violence and sadism, and the feminists complaints on this issue are spot-
on). The aim must rather be to show things differently.  
 
But therein lies a second danger, for again it will make no difference if women make 
films that compel themselves and others to attend to things unnaturally and thus 
superficially. The goal must therefore be to show things as differently as a woman would 
perceive them from a man, and yet as naturally as either would. When feminist 
filmmakers began collectively to ask themselves how they would attend differently but 
naturally to the same events being attended to by men (how, for example, a wife would 
 
10 See Laura Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema", Screen 16, No. 3 (Spring, 
1975); reprinted in the anthology Women and the Cinema: A Critical Anthology, edited by Karyn 
Kay and Gerald Peary (New York, New York: E. P. Dutton Company, 1977); and also 
'afterthoughts' in "Afterthoughts on 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema' Inspired by Duel in 
the Sun", Framework, Nos. 15-17 (Summer, 1981), pages 12-15. 
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attend to a child playing in a park differently from her husband sitting on the bench next 
to her), films of uncommon power may be conceived. 
 
They will not differ from other films in stark or obvious ways, but rather in ways as 
subtle as the difference in how a wife and a husband attend to their child playing in the 
park. The differences will be only non-consciously and cumulatively ascertainable over 
the entire course of a film or perhaps even collections of films, akin to the differences 
that distinguish Bresson from Ozu, to none of which one can easily point or even 
consciously attend but can only sense by having absorbed the hesitancy of a cut here, a 
slight extension of attention there, etc.. 
 
If and when such films are made, the differences between them and the common run 
will accrue exactly to the point that Pudovkin pressed upon us so long ago, namely that 
powerful films will enable us to encounter things as our most profound and sensitive 
observers would naturally attend to them. 
 
We can now begin to sense, I think, how intrinsically restrictive yet compelling are the 
implications of Pudovkin's precept when correctly construed. We have yet to register 
clearly, however, their moral dimension. To understand comprehensively what we have 
been discussing, we must turn again to Kant, for Pudovkin's precept for the experiential 
coherence of films, implying the primacy of matter over form, reaffirms the 
transcendental constraint on human construction recognized by Kant a century and a 
half before, and with it the primacy of ethical reason. 
 
